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Abstract  
In postcolonial India, narratives about Muslim women have revolved around tropes, such as tin 
talaq (divorce), purdah (veil), polygamy and Islam. These have always played a significant role to 
shape their homogenised identity: an existence of oppression and subordination. However, the 
paper will try to argue that the marginalisation of Muslim women is not only structural but also 
discursive (popular as well as religious), which produce them as ‘victims’ and ‘voiceless others’. 
The paper will also try to argue that Muslim women have already been discursively produced as 
incapable of progressive thinking, and waging struggle against their subordination. Therefore, the 
paper shall make an attempt to examine the impact of popular as well as Islamic discourses in 
shaping the identity of Muslim women in India, and locate those alternative spaces, where Muslim 
women can challenge their homogenised existence as a category as well as dominant discourses 
on their victimhood. 
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Introduction 
Discourses do not automatically cause social 
inequalities but that they are both indicative of 
the position of any group within a given society 
and provide a justificatory context in which 
inequities can arise, persist, and even be made 
to seem normal (Sarkar, 2008: 199). Dominant 
discourses locate identities of Muslim women1 
in their victimhood and passivity. However, it is 
equally important to locate those discourses, 
which construct and stereotype their identity, 
as discourses and stereotypes are linked to 
social exclusions. The discourses, as dictated by 
Foucault (1980), are not saintly innocent 
vegetarians but implicated with power and 
institutions, based on epistemological violence 
and institutional hierarchies. These discourses 
fiercely compete with each other for occupying 
and, hegemonising our realms of knowledge, 
spheres of morality and ways of thinking (Basu, 
2010: 77-80). Discourse, as defined by Foucault 
(1980), refers to: ways of constituting 
knowledge, together with the social practices, 
forms of subjectivity and power relations, 
which are inherent in such knowledge and 
relations between them. Discourses are more 
than ways of thinking and producing meaning. 
They constitute the 'nature' of the body, 
unconscious and conscious mind and emotional 
life of the subjects they seek to govern 
(Weedon, 1987: 108). It is also a form of power 
that circulates in the social field, and can attach 
to strategies of domination as well as those of 
resistance. 
Dominant discourses, which portray Muslim 
women in India as ‘passive victims’ or ‘voiceless 
others’ always dominate alternative discourses, 
which tend to portray them as empowered and 
capable of making their decisions (Shaban, 
                                                          
1 Muslim women in India should not be considered as a 
homogenous entity. Differences in their experiences are 
shaped by their location in class, region and family as 
well. Educational attainment and opportunities or lack of 
it, are also important indicators to mould their 
experiences. Therefore, the issue of heterogeneity needs 
to be mentioned. However, for the theoretical 
requirement, I am addressing the identity question of 
Muslim women by considering them as a unitary 
category. 
2012). These discourses contest tooth and nail 
among themselves in order to control to make 
us think, speak, perceive “reality” or “truth”. 
Therefore, we can argue that identities to a 
large extent are discursive. The discursive 
identity of Muslim women as “oppressed” and 
subjugated prevails over those alternative 
discourses, which emphasise their agency and 
resistance to hegemonic structures of 
patriarchy, religion and community (Shaban, 
2012). 
In the Indian context, discourses on Muslim 
women can be divided under few heads:  
discourses based on Islamic tradition2 and 
popular discourses, which are comprised by the 
media, Indian state as well as national debates 
on Muslim issues. Therefore, the paper argues 
that the identity construction of Muslim 
women is a continuous production of discursive 
practices and tradition. This argument does not 
deny the significance of factors like socio-
economic marginalisation, discriminations, 
policies of the derelict Indian state in 
perpetuating their subordination, etc. However, 
it argues that Islamic discursive tradition and 
practices may further reinforce Muslim 
women’s marginalisation in community as well 
as in society.  
The paper argues in favour of delving into 
alternative discourses, which highlight the 
politics of difference and heterogeneity within 
the community and show that Muslim women 
may also develop a critique of their own 
marginality from their locations and 
perspectives. This paper will try to address a 
few questions: a) how the politics of 
                                                          
2 Talal Asad delineated the concept of Islamic Discursive 
Tradition. He argued that Islamic discursive tradition is 
always historically situated, and tied to and produced by 
power. It is integrally related to the production of 
knowledge and institutional conditions for the 
production of knowledge. Islam becomes an arena of 
many processes that become Islamic because they 
belong to the discursive tradition of Islam. According to 
Asad, the tradition consists essentially of discourses that 
seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form, 
and purpose of a given practice that precisely because it 
is established and has a history. The task of Islamic 
discursive tradition is to maintain orthodoxy and 
dominance of dominant discourses (Manger, 2013).  
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representation through dominant discourses 
homogenises the community? b) apart from 
popular discourses, how do Islamic discursive 
practices affect the formation of the category 
of ‘Muslim Women’ in India? c) is there any 
significance of alternative discourses to disturb 
the homogenised category of Muslim women? 
In this way, the paper will make an initiative to 
scrutinise the formation of dominant discourses 
on Muslim women, and identify them as one of 
major reasons of their marginalisation in the 
mainstream. Moreover, the paper will also 
highlight the significance of alternative 
discourses as sites, which may challenge the 
dominant representation of Muslim women as 
‘powerless others’. Therefore, the paper argues 
that the identity of Muslim women is not only 
shaped by dominant discourses but also by 
alternative discourses, which tend to show that 
identity and subjectivity are not fixed rather in 
a state of continuous making.  
Methodology 
This article has followed the hermeneutical 
method, which would enable us to take a 
holistic or ‘contextual’ approach to the analysis 
of women’s question in Muslim society. It is a 
way of clarifying the meaning of a text by 
interpreting it historically. This method revolves 
around the text, the author and the context. 
Therefore, hermeneutical model can help us to 
locate women’s rights with regard to three 
aspects of the Quran as the text: a) the context 
in which the text was written and the way 
women’s rights have been addressed; b) the 
grammatical composition of the text; and c) the 
whole text, its worldview. It may be argued that 
the method of Quranic interpretation on 
women’s rights and equality is subject to 
specific time, history and particular 
circumstances. The practice of polygamy was 
found acceptable in ancient times due to wars 
and other factors. However, interpreting this 
practice as relevant in contemporary context 
may be considered as a product of patriarchal 
setup. A reader must understand the 
implications of the Quranic expressions during 
the time in which they were expressed in order 
to determine their proper meaning. 
Interpretation of women’s rights in Quran can 
be divided under two heads: reading and 
exegesis. At the level of a reading, every reader 
can interpret. The attitudes, experiences, 
memory and perspectives of the language of 
each reader shape the level of interpretation.  
At the level of exegesis, an attempt is made to 
overcome individual perspectives to approach 
the Quran more objectively (Wadud, 1999, 3-7). 
Therefore, to locate women’s rights in Islam, 
one should exegete the Quran from a gender 
perspective by giving adequate respect to the 
particular context and time. However, the irony 
is that male-dominated society has never been 
successful to define women’s rights, bypassing 
the gendered attitudes embedded in this 
hierarchical society. In the words of Asghar Ali 
Engineer, Islam is an egalitarian religion but it is 
the male-dominated society, which has taken 
away women’s rights and there has been a 
requirement to revisit Islamic legal structures. 
The Quranic verses are divided under two 
heads, namely, contextual and normative. 
When it comes to women’s rights, normative 
pronouncements have precedence over 
contextual. However, during the early 
centuries, contextual often had precedence 
over normative, and it had been quite ‘normal’ 
that time (Engineer, 2013, 27-30). Hence, these 
formulations became widely acceptable in that 
society. In modern society, women’s rights 
have been treated as normative rather than 
contextual. 
Here reference can be drawn to the aspect of 
milk-e-yamin, i.e., legitimising sexual relations 
with the slave girls. Jurists from all schools on 
Islamic Jurisprudence do agree on this but it 
cannot be accepted in our modern society 
(Engineer, 2013, 34-41).  Therefore, the 
question of women’s rights and identity has to 
be addressed in changing socio-political and 
economic context. It also shows that the 
discursive identity of Muslim women is not free 
from the politics of interpretation and 
misinterpretations, which are contextual and 
largely indigenous.  
Community and Marginalisation: On Politics of 
Representation 
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Dominant discourses3 on Muslim community 
have represented them as homogenous 
community spelled with a capital C. It not only 
upholds the ideals of unity and common 
experience of marginality but has also 
generated stereotypes. For example, the Hindu 
nationalists have always levelled the 
community as ‘terrorists’, anti-nationals’, 
‘suspicious’ and Muslim males are labelled as 
‘husbands of four wives’, and many of these 
stereotyping are more political creations and 
far away from the reality as possible (Shaban, 
2012). However, the overall impact of this on 
the Muslim community is grave. It influences 
their psyche and confidence to assert their 
rights (Shaban, 2012, 3-7). This sort of 
representation overlooks the fact that Muslims 
are deeply divided on the lines of caste, class, 
language and regional locations. Even on 
ideological standpoints, community is divided. 
Moreover, this homogeneous representation 
seems to be problematic for Muslim women as 
well. At one hand, the hegemonic 
representation of the community as ‘backward’ 
or ‘conservative’ tends to fix their identity in 
larger society; on the other, it also overlooks 
internal conflicts on the women’s question 
within the community. The conservative, 
progressive, as well fundamentalists groups 
within the community have conflicting 
standpoints on women’s rights in Islam. In 
India, the yardstick of defining an Islamic group 
or school as conservative does not only depend 
on their unwillingness to accept western values 
but also on their rigid stand to accept women’s 
rights, already guaranteed within the Islamic 
framework. Moreover, fundamentalists are 
those who always dodge to change their 
standpoint on women’s rights.  Several schools 
like, Hanafi, Maliki, Safai’i, Hanbali support 
men’s right to triple talaq (divorce in one 
                                                          
3 Discourse can be defined as entity, which is composed 
of sequences, signs and relations among objects, subjects 
and statements. It is the generation of the concept of the 
conversation within all modalities and contexts. It 
signifies the totality of codified language used in a given 
field of intellectual enquiry and of social practice. 
Therefore, discursive production means the production 
and prevalence of a particular knowledge by the 
dominant groups in society (Howarth, 2002: 14-24).  
sitting), and polygamy, as these are embedded 
in religion. Conservative interpretations also 
justify wife beating, and impose several 
restrictions on women in the name of religion 
(Engineer, 1999). Moreover, their perceptions 
and interpretations on women’s role in society 
are based on the rigid demarcation between 
men and women. On the contrary, 
progressiveness of an Islamic group in India 
cannot be defined in terms of their inclination 
for Western values; rather progressive groups 
uphold the gender-just nature of Islam, which 
gives them extra mileage to fight for women’s 
rights. Progressives like late Ashgar Ali Engineer 
have always argued that women’s rights are 
inherent in Islam but the patriarchal society has 
taken away rights from women. Progressive 
groups have not only relentlessly challenged 
the conservative interpretations but also 
exhorted for reinterpretations of the Quranic 
verses. However, in reality, progressive voices 
hardly are represented in larger society, and 
the women question is mainly handled by the 
conservative sections within the community. 
Dominant discourses hardly highlight all these 
internal differences and conflicts, especially on 
women’s issues, within the community. The 
politics of representation should reflect the 
difference among women rather than identity, 
as it is crucial for understanding gender 
oppression and marginality.   
The making of the category of Muslim in India 
has been typically influenced by popular 
discourses, which are characterised by 
prevalent trends in the larger social milieu 
about the conservatism and ingrained 
backwardness of the community. It may also be 
argued that Muslim women are discursively4 
represented as backward, victimised, silenced 
and eventually invisible, and it has undergirded 
the construction of ‘other’ identity categories. 
                                                          
4 Dominant discourses also include discourse analysis. It 
incorporates a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
material-speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, 
interviews, policies, ideas, even organisations and 
institutions – as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ that enable the 
subjects to experience the world of objects, words, and 
practices (Howarth, 2002, 35-40). 
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Zoya Hasan and Ritu Menon have pointed out 
that recent interventions on Muslim women in 
postcolonial India are caught up in 
misconceptions that usually leave Muslim 
women invisible. Two sets of 
misunderstandings seem to plague discussions 
of Muslim women: the tendency to see 
Muslims, particularly Muslim women, as a 
monolithic category; and the overwhelming 
importance attached to Islam, especially the 
Muslim personal law in defining Muslim 
women’s status (Menon, 2004, 45-50). It also 
highlights the ways in which gender and racially 
defined community and class ideologies worked 
simultaneously to deny even middle class 
Muslim women the limited visibility (Sarkar, 
2008: 198-200). 
The marginal status of Muslim women has also 
closely been associated with stereotypes, 
entrenched by tin talaq (divorce), multiple 
marriages and purdah.5  Such stereotypes in 
both popular and academic discourses are 
further reinforced by the systematic scholarship 
and information on the unequal access to 
resources and opportunities experienced by 
different groups of women in India today 
(Sarkar, 2008). It is also important to highlight 
that the stereotyped images of the Muslim 
community colour the understanding about the 
community, and affect even the policies 
formulated for them. Stereotypes also cause 
discrimination in the labour market as well as 
public and private institutions (Shaban, 2012: 7-
10). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that 
Muslim women’s marginalisation is not only 
socio-economic but also discursive as well as 
political. 
Islamic Discursive Tradition and Muslim 
Women in India 
Apart from popular discourses, religious and 
community discursive practices play an 
important role to construct women’s identity 
                                                          
5 Purdah is a religious and social practice of female 
seclusion prevalent among some Muslim countries. It 
takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes and 
the requirement that women cover their bodies so as to 
cover their skin and conceal their form (Engineer, 2013, 
173). 
within the community. Being a minority 
community, religious traditions and cultural 
practices have remained significant, and the 
community has remained very protective about 
their practices, traditions and symbols.  
In the words of Talal Asad, the Islamic 
discursive tradition can be understood as a 
“historically evolving set of discourses, 
embodied in practices and institutions of 
Islamic societies and hence deeply imbricated 
in the material life of those inhabiting them” 
(Anjum, 2006: 4). He also mentioned that the 
content and context of the scriptures, the 
historical experience of Islam in its formative 
years, etc., constitute the discursive tradition of 
Islam. However, Asad had never recognised the 
role of local and indigenous practices of Islam. 
Asad’s ingenuity lies in his rethinking of the 
concept of tradition in order to grasp the 
meaning of past. His reworking of the concept 
of traditions: of the symbolic anthropologists 
who had seen tradition as emanating from 
autonomous religious symbols (rather than 
linked with social process), and of those who 
saw tradition in an exact opposite way: merely 
a ruse, a manipulative ideology, and a guise for 
motivations and factors whose true provenance 
lies in political and economic realm. According 
to Asad, both views misconstrue the nature of 
tradition, and overlooked the possibilities 
opened up by the past that is embodied in a 
tradition. Asad sees the basic functions of 
traditions as establishing orthodoxy in a given 
historical and material context. In his words, 
“[a] tradition consists essentially of discourses 
that seek to instruct” (Anjum, 2006: 3). He also 
mentioned that orthodoxy is a relationship of 
power, and the question remains how it comes 
to be established as one set of doctrines and no 
other. However, Asad said that anthropologist 
must not concede to multiple “Islams”.  Asad’s 
task remains unfinished until the apparent 
tension between a single Islamic discursive 
tradition and multiple local orthodoxies is 
theorised.   
Now the puzzle derived from the above 
discussion is— can we imagine Muslim 
women’s rights and identity in India by 
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overlooking “multiple interpretations”, which 
are made of indigenous political, socio-
economic contexts, local practices, etc.? 
Muslim women in India are not only the citizens 
of the Indian state but also the member of the 
largest minority community, which is socio-
economically a backward community. 
Culturally, this community has presented itself 
as a self-legislating and self-governing 
community, which exhibits their absolute 
control over their religion and the private 
domain. The Indian State has never tried to 
intervene in these domains in order to maintain 
and respect the minority identity and culture. 
These contexts have profound impact on 
Muslim women’s rights and identity. The 
political and religious leadership within the 
community have always remained protective 
and conservative about Muslim women’s rights. 
Therefore, the result has been obvious: the 
great tradition of Islam has always emphasised 
the principles of egalitarianism and gender 
justice but the multiple interpretations (read: 
misinterpretations) which are embedded in our 
indigenous political, communal and socio-
economic contexts and practices have 
produced a homogenised discourse, which 
portrays Muslim women as “oppressed” and 
“victims” in our society (Engineer, 1999). The 
verses on talaq (divorce), polygamy, and wife 
beating have been interpreted in such a 
manner that has never been compatible with 
the humanist notion of women’s rights in Islam 
in India. As late Asghar Ali Engineer forcefully 
argued that Islam had given all rights to women 
but this male-dominated and patriarchal 
society had taken away their rights (Engineer, 
1999: 25-30). Interpretations and 
misinterpretations had never been freed from 
the patriarchal-influences and bypassed the 
alternative discourses, which highlight Muslim 
women’s agency to negotiate with hegemonic 
patriarchal structures. Therefore, Islamic 
discursive tradition and practices have played a 
great role to shape their identity. 
Muslim Women and Islamic Discursive 
Tradition on Personal Laws in India 
In India, the discursive identity of Muslim 
women has always revolved around the tropes 
of personal laws, triple talaq and purdah 
(veiling). All these tropes have produced them 
as a homogenous as well as political category. 
National debates on the Shah Bano case, 
Imrana6 and Gudiya7 cases have not only reified 
their victimhood but also raised the need for 
Muslim personal law reform to protect 
women’s rights in Islam. The issue of personal 
law reform is not a new issue in Islamic 
societies. Many countries like Egypt, Malaysia 
had opted for Muslim personal law reform to 
ensure gender justice. However, in India, the 
issue of Muslim personal law reform through 
Uniform Civil Code8 has remained extremely 
                                                          
6 In 2005, a 70-year-old father-in-law raped a young girl 
named Imrana in a remote village of Uttar Pradesh. 
Religious leaders and the caste panchayat issued the 
fatwa that she had to get married to her father-in-law, 
and consider her husband as her son. The Women’s 
Commission and the State could not do anything on the 
ground that it was an internal affair of the community. 
7 Gudiya's case came into media focus in August when 
Mohammad Arif, who had gone missing in action since 
the 1999 Kargil war, was repatriated by Pakistan as a 
Prisoner of War. During the five-year absence of Arif, 
who was presumed dead after initially being declared a 
deserter, Gudiya had married Taufiq and carried his child. 
After his marriage, Arif had spent a very short time with 
Gudiya, as he was called for service during the Kargil 
conflict. On his return to his native village, Arif found his 
wife Gudiya married to Taufiq. However, the village 
council reunited Arif and Gudiya following a decision. 
Taufiq, who hails from Pataudi village in Gurgaon, tried 
to get Gudiya back but the council ruled in favour of Arif 
and, she had since then been living with him (Kumar, 
2006: 1). 
8 Uniform Civil Code in India is the debate to replace the 
personal laws based on the scriptures and customs of 
each major religious community in the country with a 
common set governing every citizen. These laws are 
distinguished from public law and cover marriage, 
divorce, inheritance, adoption and maintenance. Article 
44 of the Directive Principles of State Policy set its 
implementation as duty of the State. Apart from being an 
important issue regarding secularism in India, and it 
became one of the most controversial topics in 
contemporary politics during the Shah Bano case in 1985. 
The debate then focused on the Muslim Personal Law, 
which is partially based on the Sharia law and remains 
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sensitive to the community. It is perhaps due to 
the reason that discourses on personal laws are 
religious, and based on their minority identity. 
Any reform in personal laws has been perceived 
as a threat to Islamic tradition and practices. 
That is why: Foucault correctly pointed out that 
in every society, the production of discourse is 
at once controlled, selected, organised and 
redistributed according to a certain number of 
producers, whose aim is to sustain its power, 
and dominant discourses are always effective, 
organising and regulating relations of power, as 
it is a regime of truth (Basu, 2010: 69).  
In India, the religious authority within the 
community has always controlled discourses on 
personal laws. The way religious authority 
(Moulavis and Ulemas) constructs the 
knowledge about women’s rights in Islam, 
makes it inevitable that a dominant discourse 
has the power to interpret major social, 
political and economic issues and events. 
Dominant discourses, as implicated with power 
and institutions, silence the other side of truth, 
rationality and universality. Dominant 
knowledge, as produced by the religious 
leadership, completely overlooks the necessity 
of Ijtehad (rational and creative interpretation 
of the Quran) to address women’s rights. The 
progressive section within the community has 
always raised their voice for the creative 
reinterpretation of women’s rights in India. 
However, progressive discourses are always 
dominated by conservative discourses.  
Therefore, the socio-political and cultural 
meanings of triple talaq, purdah (veiling) and 
polygamy have never been from the patriarchal 
influence, which have always accorded Muslim 
women a subordinate position in society. 
Muslim women’s identity has to be perceived 
through these socio-political and cultural 
practices, as mediated through discourses and 
the effects of power (Basu, 2010: 76). 
The question of Muslim women’s identity 
cannot be understood without the references 
to two trends of Islamic discursive tradition. In 
                                                                                              
unreformed since 1937, permitting unilateral divorce and 
polygamy in the country(Hasan, 2000). 
 
India, we not only have a great tradition of 
Islam but also “little traditions” of Islam 
(Anjum, 2006: 3). It means that there have 
been differences between Islam as a core 
religion and as “lived Islam”. In our society, 
lives of Muslim women revolve around this 
“lived Islam”. Islamic discursive tradition in 
India remains incomplete without the light 
thrown upon the relationship between 
tradition and orthodoxy. In India, the religious 
leadership has remained over-possessive about 
the rights of Muslim women in India. 
Misogynist interpretations of the Quran, 
different types of fatwas exhibit that religious 
orthodoxies not only show a power hierarchy 
but also give rise to “little traditions”, which are 
products of our own time, space and context. 
The impact of discursive traditions is best 
manifested through the politics of 
interpretations of the text. In Islam, the art of 
interpretation of the religious text remains 
central because it does not only control the 
production of knowledge on Islamic way of life 
and women’s rights but also denies women to 
access the religious knowledge and, which 
ultimately affects their identity. The production 
of religious knowledge is backed by patriarchal 
power politics as well as the male worldview. 
That is why the principle of gender equality as 
ensured in Islam, has never been materialised 
in reality, as interpretations of rights of Muslim 
women have revolved around patriarchal 
power politics and, the difference between 
conservative and progressive standpoints on 
crucial issues like divorce, polygamy, etc.  
Several schools like the Jafari, the Hanafi, the 
Maliki, the Safai’i, the Hanbali support men’s 
right to triple talaq (talaq in one sitting), and 
polygamy as these are, for them, embedded in 
religion. The Quran emphasises that divorce 
should not be a hasty impulsive act but should 
also be finalised only after a period of waiting 
during which the couple is counselled and, 
given a chance to rethink on the decision.  
Talaq is a procedure that can be initiated by the 
husband alone without the consent of his wife. 
Besides, the exercise of talaq is extra-judicial 
and in no way subject to external check. 
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Technically, therefore, the power of the 
husband to divorce is absolute. Talaq may be 
pronounced in a number of ways, e.g., (1) 
Ahsan (2) Hasan (3) Bid’ ah. The Ahsan form of 
talaq is Talaq-I-Sunna. The repudiation does 
not take place at a single sitting nor can it take 
place during menstruation. Iddat is observed 
during the period following menstruation that 
is tuhr or the purity period. Two arbitrators 
from both sides are appointed to bring about 
reconciliation. During the iddah period the 
marriage is not dissolved. If reconciliation takes 
place, the marriage is saved and no nikah is 
needed. In Ahsan talaq even after the third 
pronouncement of talaq, after the ‘iddah’9 
period, the marriage is revocable. The man can 
remarry his divorced wife. This practice is in 
accordance with the teaching of the Quran and 
according to Sunna rules.10 Both Sunni and Shia 
schools approve of talaq-a-ahsan. The Hasan 
form is talaq-a-sunna but is not as commonly 
accepted as talaq-a-ahsan. The man is 
supposed to pronounce talaq during the 
successive periods of purity or tuhr. A couple 
can live together as husband and wife if the 
husband so desires before he pronounces the 
third talaq. On the third talaq, the marriage is 
                                                          
9 Iddat has been defined as the waiting period for a 
widow or divorced. In Shariat terminology, it is the 
waiting period for a woman when her nikah with a man is 
no more valid for one reason or the other.  The waiting 
period means that after the cessation of nikah the 
woman has to restrain herself for another nikah until the 
prescribed period of three months is over (Engineer, 
1999: 12-15). 
10 Muslims in India are divided into two major sects, 
Sunni and Shia. Sunni Muslims regard themselves as the 
orthodox and traditionalist branch of Islam. The word 
Sunni comes from "Ahl al-Sunna", the people of the 
tradition. The tradition in this case refers to practices 
based on precedent or reports of the actions of the 
Prophet Muhammad and those close to him. Sunnis 
venerate all the Prophets mentioned in the Qoran, but 
particularly Muhammad as the final Prophet. Shiites, in 
contrast, believe that only the heirs of the fourth caliph, 
Ali, are the legitimate successors of Mohammed. All 
subsequent Muslim leaders are seen as temporal figures. 
Each sect has many different schools or sub-sects. Sunnis 
are divided in four sects: the Hanafi, the Malaki, the 
Shafai, and the Hanbali. Indian Shias are are divided into 
three sub-sects: the Ithna-Asharis, the Ismailis and Zaidis 
(Engineer, 1999: 20-25). 
dissolved and the talaq is irrevocable. 
Therefore, he cannot remarry her. If she wants 
to remarry, she has to perform Halala, i.e., 
marry another man, consummate the marriage, 
consequently dissolve it, and only then remarry 
her divorced husband. Prophets and Caliph Ali 
condemn this process of Halala. All Shia and 
Sunni schools of thought have approved of 
Talaq-a-Hasan. Since it is not irrevocable, it is 
not very popular; yet, the Hanbali Sunni School 
gives it more importance than to other types of 
talaq. Talaq-a-Bidah is a form of divorce, which 
is severely criticised since it goes against the 
rules laid down by the Quran. However, the 
Sunna approves it. In this form of talaq the 
husband unilaterally, without the consent or 
knowledge of the wife, pronounces talaq. 
Husband can pronounce Talaq once or three 
times simultaneously, without paying attention 
to the fact whether wife is in a state of thur. 
The Prophet did clearly not approve of this 
form of divorce (Baxamusa, 1994: 110-112). 
Even the provisions relating to the polygamy 
and veiling in the holy Quran have been 
misinterpreted for several times. It is true that 
marriages up to four are valid but conditions of 
equal love and, justice were also stipulated in 
the Quran with a context. It was precisely 
meant for orphans and war widows to provide 
them security through marriage. Noted 
Pakistani commentator Maulana Muhammad 
Ali said that verse 4:3 permits polygamy under 
circumstances; it does not enjoin it, nor even 
permit it unconditionally (Engineer, 1999: 118-
122). Therefore, it is quite clear that in order to 
uphold the traditional values of male-
dominated society, the real spirit of the Quran 
and its deep concern with justice are totally 
overlooked by the art of misinterpretation and 
misappropriation of the religion. In this way, 
little traditions influence women’s lived 
experiences. 
State and Political Leadership: Constructing 
Muslim Women as ‘Other’ 
The whole discussion will remain incomplete, if 
the role of the Indian State is not elaborated in 
reinforcing dominant discourses on personal 
laws. In a country like India, where the Muslim 
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community is the largest minority, protection of 
Islamic discursive tradition remains the most 
important duty for the Indian State. The Indian 
State for many times has ended up with a 
judgment call where: the dominant discourse 
on Muslim women’s rights to a large extent 
prevailed over the alternative sets of 
knowledge, which derives its inspirations from 
a more egalitarian and gender-based 
understanding of Islam. The Indian State has 
remained confused regarding: which discourse 
to endorse: Dominant or Subjugated: Liberal or 
Communitarian: Muslim women as citizens of 
the Indian state or the wards of community?   
Muslim women in India do not only suffer due 
to her location in the marginalised community 
but also from the dubious treatment of the 
state. This pro-community attitude has forced 
the state to overlook many structures of 
discriminations embedded in the intra-group 
relations, and it ultimately portrays Muslim 
women as the ‘other’ in the vocabulary of the 
Indian political system. This was visible in Shah 
Bano Case (1986).11 While all other Indian 
women may claim the legal right to spousal 
support after divorce, Muslim women may not. 
While other women criminally prosecute their 
husbands for bigamy, Muslim women may not. 
According to the Sharia Act, a divorced Muslim 
woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair 
provision of maintenance within the period of 
Iddat; two years of maintenance for her 
                                                          
11 According to Shariat Act (1937), Muslim women cannot 
demand lifelong maintenance after talaq. It is generally 
supported on the ground of minority community identity, 
religion and culture. In 1986, when Shah Bano went to 
the Supreme Court for demanding her lifelong 
maintenance, it gave rise to a clash between the 
collective rights of the community and individual rights 
and identity. The Supreme Court gave its verdict in 
favour of Shah Bano. However, Muslim fundamentalists 
protested this move vehemently on the ground that any 
change in Shariat Act by the State is against the identity 
of Muslim community. So the Shah Bano case (1986) 
shows that women’s claim to equal rights is treated as a 
betrayal to community, the culture and the religion. In 
addition, the Indian state very consciously 
institutionalises gender inequality in personal laws on the 
ground of minority identity and culture (Hasan, 2000: 
283-287). 
children; mehr12 and all the properties should 
be given to her by her relatives and husband’s 
relatives. If she does not get it at the time of 
divorce then she can apply to the Magistrate to 
direct her husband to follow the order. In 
response to this, Shah Bano, (a 65-year-old 
woman) filed a case against her husband and 
the Supreme Court granted her appeal for 
lifelong maintenance from her husband. 
Nevertheless, this judgement was not a simple 
one; it opened the floodgates of debates and 
discussions on the tricky relationship between 
gender, community and the state. In response 
to the Shah Bano case and the subsequent 
legislation, Muslim community leaders split 
broadly into two camps. Conservative leaders 
considered the judgment as an attack to 
Muslim identity as well as Muslim personal law. 
Progressive leaders felt that the Supreme Court 
judgement was in accordance with the basic 
tenets of Islam and thus it was not an intrusion 
in Muslim personal law (Hasan, 2000: 279-285).  
Although progressive leaders did not agree with 
everything the judgment said, they supported 
the substantive conclusion: that Muslim man 
should provide adequate maintenance for 
destitute, divorced women beyond the period 
of Iddat. Constitutional scholar Granville Austin 
(2004) has argued that the conservative 
opposition was not only imbued with 
ideological factors but also with economic and 
political factors. The judgement was not only an 
attack to Muslim identity but also to the 
economic interests of Muslim men who might 
otherwise be faced with maintenance payment 
to ex-wives. Additionally, the political interests 
of the conservative Muslim leadership were 
threatened as well. If personal laws were 
codified, the religious leaders would lose their 
power to interpret the Quran. To soothe ruffled 
                                                          
12 In Islam, mahr is a mandatory payment, in the form of 
money or possessions paid by the groom, or by groom's 
father, to the bride at the time of marriage that legally 
becomes her property. While the mahr is often money, it 
can also be anything agreed upon by the bride such as 
jewellery, home goods, furniture, a dwelling or some 
land. Mahr is typically specified in the marriage contract 
signed during an Islamic marriage (Engineer, 2013: 180-
181). 
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feelings, the Rajiv Gandhi Government enacted 
the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill, 1986. This bill explicitly excluded 
Muslim women from the right to maintenance 
available under the CrPC13 (Hasan, 2000: 265-
269). 
The promise of formal equality to all and 
ensuring rights to Muslim women is in 
juxtaposition, especially when Indian State 
surrenders to the conservative standpoint of 
women’s rights, bypassing minority progressive 
views. By accepting the conservative position, 
the state itself constructs the identity of 
Muslim community as conservative and 
reluctant to change. However, the Indian State 
has its own logic. The conservatives as well as 
fundamentalists can label any sort of 
intervention to reform Muslim personal law in 
favour of women as an intrusion in minority 
community. Therefore, protecting minority 
identity and culture becomes the major 
concern for the state and in order to do so the 
women’s question remains neglected and 
conferred to the hands of the community 
leaders. It also proves that laws are immensely 
patriarchal in nature and influenced by the 
male worldviews. Rather than acting as agents 
of social change, laws reinforce male 
domination against women (Mackinnon, 1989: 
5-6). In fact, the protectionist role of the state 
not only reinforces the minority community 
identity of Muslim women but also marginalises 
from the mainstream.  
Alternative Discourses on Muslim Women’s 
Agency and Resistance 
Therefore, dominant discourses on Muslim 
women have always presented their 
quintessential images. These dominant forms 
                                                          
13 The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) is the main 
legislation on procedure for administration of 
substantive criminal law in India.It was enacted in 1973 
and came into force on 1 April 1974. It provides the 
machinery for the investigation of crime, apprehension 
of suspected criminals, collection of evidence, 
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused 
person and the determination of punishment of the 
guilty. Additionally, it also deals with public nuisance, 
prevention of offences and maintenance of wife, child 
and parents (Hasan, 2000). 
of knowledge within a society are always 
determined in and through power relations, 
which are an effect of knowledge production. 
Moreover, the category of Muslim women is 
produced within discourses with special 
reference to the discursive formation of a 
particular period and culture.   
Above discussions show that how some 
discourses have shaped, and created meaning 
systems that have gained the status and 
currency of 'truth', and dominate how we 
define and organise both our social world, and 
ourselves whilst other discourses are 
marginalised and subjugated, yet potentially 
'offer' sites where hegemonic practices can be 
contested, challenged and 'resisted'. In 
Foucault's view, there is no fixed and definitive 
structuring of either social (or personal) identity 
or practices, as there is in a socially determined 
view in which the subject is completely 
socialised. Rather, both the formation of 
identities and practices are related to, or are a 
function of historically specific discourses. An 
understanding of how these and other 
discursive constructions are formed may open 
the way for change and contestation. Thus, 
there are both discourses (dominant and 
alternative) that constrain the production of 
knowledge, dissent and difference and some 
that enable 'new' knowledge and difference(s). 
The questions that arise within this framework, 
are to do with how some discourses maintain 
their authority, how some 'voices' get heard 
whilst others are silenced, who benefits and 
how - that is, questions addressing issues of 
power/empowerment/disempowerment 
(Foucault, 1980: 80-90). 
Dominant representations of the Muslim 
women through stereotypes like parda, talaq, 
polygamy not only reinforce a certain mode of 
knowledge about their identity but also tend to 
overlook the role of difference in their 
experiences based on class, education, family 
background as well as regional location in 
shaping their identities. This, not only 
stereotypes also bypass the question of 
resistance and agency of Muslim women and, 
shape their identity as coherent and 
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homogeneous within popular discourses in 
India. However, it is not only “fixed identity and 
subjectivity” but identification with the 
community and social structures, which 
provides multiple dimensions to their 
existence. It is also important to mention that 
discourses are enmeshed in power, and there 
are no power relations without resistance. 
Moreover, Foucault has elaborated the fact 
that every resistance is mediated, informed, 
produced, and becomes meaningful through 
discourses and power (Foucault, 1980: 72). 
It helps us to understand that the continuous 
mediation and negotiation with the patriarchal 
structures by Muslim women. It becomes 
meaningful within the discursive framework of 
the marginalised and subjugated. It also creates 
an alternative space to locate their identity, 
scope to conceptualise the notion of dynamic 
and multi-layered subjectivities of Muslim 
women in varying contexts. It is important to 
highlight that the oppressor/oppressed model 
of gender relations, as produced by the western 
scholarship has always portrayed Muslim 
women for decades as passive and submissive 
beings, shackled by structures of patriarchy. As 
institutionalised and hegemonic male-
domination through patriarchal institutions and 
practices have not only bypassed women’s 
agency and resistance but also projected 
women’s identity as essentialised entity.   
Moreover, such a model remains encumbered 
by the binary terms of domination and 
subordination, and is also insufficiently 
attentive to motivations, desires and goals, 
which are not necessarily captured by these 
binary terms. It is an imperative to take the 
initiative to restore the absent voice of women 
to analyses of subjectivities of Muslim women, 
and present Muslim women as active agents, 
who live an existence far more complex and 
richer than past narratives have suggested. In 
the words of Saba Mahmood, agency should 
not only be defined “as a synonym for 
resistance to the relations of dominations but 
as a capacity for action that historically specific 
relations of subornation enable and create” 
(Mahmood, 2004: 12). 
As experiences of Muslim women are mediated 
through the discourses of Islam, religious 
patriarchy and community, a meaningful and 
collective resistance is possible through a 
common discursive sharing. This marginalised 
and subjugated framework has always 
highlighted the notion of alternative space in 
which Muslim women have relentlessly tried to 
negotiate with hegemonic structures in society. 
It has also raised debates between material 
basis for social action versus a common 
discursive sharing as a possible strategic ground 
for any socially meaningful and politically 
relevant collective action, such as resistance. 
Therefore, the purpose of the marginalised 
discourse is to challenge the dominant one, 
which is centred on a firm belief in the 
absolute, authentic and unquestionable 
meaning. Muslim women’s resistance and 
collective action against the hegemonic 
patriarchal structures show that a critique can 
also be developed through these alternative 
discourses.  
Role of Muslim Women as Collective Agents 
The marginalised discourses not only challenge 
the dominant one but also the liberal as well as 
poststructuralist notion of fully autonomous 
self, which conceives agency as the property of 
individuals rather than individuals as members 
of groups or socially interconnected networks 
of cause and effect. However, it is important to 
recognise that individual sufferings and 
transgressive practices are also largely 
ineffective, when it comes to challenging 
systems of oppression. Unless women 
understand themselves as members of groups, 
they will fail to see the pattern of oppression, 
and fail to understand that group resistance is 
important to challenge structural oppression 
(Bowden & Mummery, 2012). 
Muslim women from several corners of India 
have organised and voiced themselves for their 
rights. The Shah Bano case of the 1980s was a 
landmark in the discourse on “Muslim women’s 
rights” in India. At that time, however, few 
Muslim women actually participated in the 
debates, which were shaped by either male 
religious leaders or politicians or by ‘secular’ 
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women’s groups and it had scant Muslim 
representation. Since the 1980s, several 
Muslim-women led organisations have 
emerged in urban areas across the country, 
some of which have formed networks to 
advocate for Muslim women’s rights. These 
networks have different but overlapping 
ideological bases, priorities and strategies. They 
aim to challenge the authority of the Muslim 
religious leadership, represented by institutions 
such as the All India Muslim Personal Law 
Board. Today these groups are also challenging 
the dominant conception of Muslim women as 
a passive, homogenous group with a common 
set of interests. Not only this, these groups like 
the MWRN (Muslim Women Rights Network) 
and the BMMA demonstrate new forms of 
political agency and are creating a space for a 
conceptualisation of identities that complicates 
the dichotomy between religious and gender-
based interests and aims to reconcile the two in 
a manner that protects and promotes women’s 
rights without denying the importance of 
religious identity (Kirmani, 2009: 5-10). 
It signifies that they are not only the passive 
victims of their community but can also 
develop a critique of their own marginalisation 
by themselves. Several instances are there to 
substantiate this argument. In Tamilnadu, Daud 
Sharifa Khanam has taken an initiative to build 
a separate mosque for women with the claim 
that women have equal right to pray and 
worship. Not only this, her organisation STEPS 
has also delineated the concept of women’s 
jamaat to pose a challenge to the patriarchal 
nature of men’s jamaat. Women’s jamaat has 
emerged as a space where women can raise 
their voice against violence and oppression 
(Khanam, 2004: 18-25). In Lucknow (Uttar 
Pradesh), Shaista Amber has constituted All 
India Muslim Women Personal Law Board to 
challenge the male-dominated and patriarchal 
nature of All India Muslim Personal Law Board 
(Amber, 2011). The AIMPLB eventually released 
its own copy of the model nikahnama in 2005, 
which was most probably the result of both the 
initiative of its own members as well as 
external pressure from women’s groups. 
However, most women’s groups met this with 
scorn because they felt it did not outline 
sufficient protections for women and 
particularly, it does not include a provision for 
women to have the right to divorce their 
husbands and neither does it discourage the 
practice of polygamy.  
All these instances indicate women not only 
symbolise the plight of the community but also 
provide a critique of their own marginalisation 
and have their own ways to define gender 
equality within Islamic framework. The 
emergence of these groups in several parts of 
India highlights the fact that women are not 
only being vocal to the rigid and gender biased 
interpretations of the Quran but they are being 
conscious about that fact that rights are given 
and equality is ensured in the religion. 
Therefore, these initiatives not only ask for 
reinterpretation of religious texts to ensure 
gender justice but also create alternative 
discourse on Muslim women’s rights in India.  
Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it is quite clear that 
a powerful instrument for maintaining the 
marginalisation of Muslim women in 
postcolonial India was their invisibility in 
intellectual as well as public discourses. These 
discourses showed that the goals and 
objectives of gender equity and justice require 
continuous efforts to address and reduce 
sources of distress, exclusions, vulnerabilities 
and silences of Muslim women. Above 
discussion also shows that the identity of 
Muslim women is not only the part of dominant 
discourses but also of alternative discourses. 
The locus of power, operating behind these 
discourses to shape our identities needs to be 
addressed in future ventures.  
References 
Anjum, O. (2006, July 6). Islam as a Discursive 
Tradition: Talal Asad and his Interlocutors. 
Retrieved 1 October 2014, from 
www.academia.edu. 
Asad, T. (1986). The Idea of an Anthropology of 
Islam. Washington DC: Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies. 
Sur. Space and Culture, India 2015, 3:1  Page | 16  
Amber, S. (2011, September). All India Muslim 
Women Law Board. Retrieved 9 December 
2013, from 
www.muslimwomenpersonallaws.com. 
Austin, G. (2004). Working A Democratic 
Constitution: A History of the Indian 
Experience. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Baxamusa, R. (1994). Need for Change in the 
Muslim Personal Law Relating to Divorce in 
India.  
Basu, P. (2010). Post Modernism, Marxism, 
Postcolonialism. Kolkata: Avenel Press. 
Bowden, P., & J. Mummery (2012). 
Understanding Feminism. New Delhi: Rawat 
Publications. 
De, R. (2013, 21 August). Personal Laws: A 
Reality Check. Frontline  
Engineer, A. A. (2013). Islam, Women and 
Gender Justice. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing 
House. 
Engineer, A. A. (1999). The Quran, Women and 
Modern Society. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers 
Private Limited.  
Engineer, I. (2012). 'Political Leadership, 
Mobilisation and Violence', in A. Shaban, (ed.) 
Lives of Muslims in India: Politics, Exclusion and 
Violence, New Delhi: Routledge. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/ Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings - 1972-
77, trans. Gordon et al. New York: Pantheon 
Books. 
Howarth, D. (2002). Discourse. New Delhi: Viva 
Books Private Limited. 
Hasan, Z. (2000), Politics and the State in India, 
New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Khanam, S. (2004, August 21). Women's 
Mosque Planned. Retrieved 9 December 2013, 
from www.stepswomensjamat.com. 
Kirmani, N. (2009). Claiming Their Space: 
Muslim Women-led Networks and Women's 
Movement in India, International Journal of 
Women's Studies, Volume 9. 
Kumar, A. (2006, 3rd January). Gudiya Dies. 
Retrieved 8 October 2014, from 
www.thehindu.com.  
Mahmood, S. (2004). Politics of Piety: The 
Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Mackinnon, C. A (1989), Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press. 
Menon, H. Z. (2004). Unequal Citizens: A Study 
of Muslim Women in India. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Manger, L. (2013). Muslim Diversity: Local Islam 
in Local Contexts. Routledge: London. 
Naheed, U. (2009, 11 July), Muslim Women in 
India Are in Miserable Condition. Retrieved 10 
December 2013, from 
www.islamicterrorism.wordpress.com. 
Shaban, A. (2012). Introduction. In A. Shaban 
(ed.), Lives of Muslims in India (pp. 17-20), New 
Delhi: Routledge. 
Sarkar, M. (2008). Visible Histories Disappearing 
Women: Producing Muslim Womanhood in 
Late Colonial Bengal. New Delhi: Kali for 
Women. 
Wadud, A. (1999), Quran and Woman: Reading 
the Sacred Text from a Woman's Perspective. 
New Delhi: Oxdord University Press. 
Weedon, J. (1987). Discourses on Several 
Subjects. Gale ECCO Print Editions. 
Acknowledgements 
I kindly convey my regards to the anonymous 
referees for their insightful as well as 
thoughtful comments. I am thankful to them 
for their time, knowledge and expertise. 
 
 
